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Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) exist in a physical environment and comprise both physical
components and a control program. Physical components are inherently liable to failure and yet
an overall CPS is required to operate safely, reliably and cost effectively. This paper proposes
a framework for deriving the specification of the software control component of a CPS from an
understanding of the behaviour required of the overall system in its physical environment. The
two key elements of this framework are (i) an extension to the use of rely/guarantee conditions to
allow specifications to be obtained systematically from requirements (as expressed in terms of the
required behaviour in the environment) and nested assumptions (about the physical components of
the CPS); and (ii) the use of time bands to record the temporal properties required of the CPS at
a number of different granularities. The key contribution is in combining these ideas; using time
bands overcomes a significant drawback in earlier work. The paper also addresses the means by
which the reliability of a CPS can be addressed by challenging each rely condition in the derived
specification and, where appropriate, improve robustness and/or define weaker guarantees that can
be delivered with respect to the corresponding weaker rely conditions.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems; real-time systems; time bands; rely-guarantee; concurrency;
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1. INTRODUCTION
The construction of large socio-technical real-time systems,
such as those found in cyber-physical applications, presents
a number of significant challenges, both technical (see for
example [1]) and organisational. The complexity of such
systems makes all stages of their development (requirements
analysis, specification, design, implementation, deployment
and maintenance/evolution) subject to failure and costly re-
working. This paper presents a framework that makes it
possible to relate the specification of the overall system to
that of a suitable control program. The objective being
to suggest a way to produce resilient systems that degrade
gracefully when physical failures occur.4
Typically Embedded Systems (ES) and Cyber Physical
Systems (CPS) are comprised of a control program linked
(by sensors and actuators) to physical components that can
both sense and bring about changes in the physical world.
The overall system requirements (the “client’s view”) are
about what should happen in the physical world. Many
authors (e.g. [2]) have argued that this is therefore a sensible
place to ground a specification.
Given that there are known techniques for developing
4There are of course other important considerations with CPS such as
performance and security. Whilst recognising their importance, these issues
are not addressed in the current paper.
programs to satisfy formal specifications, an obvious
challenge is that of arriving at a formal specification for
software control components of an ES or CPS. This is a
challenge addressed by many authors (see Section 5 on
related work).
The idea of starting from an understanding of what should
happen in the physical world was followed in previous
work but encountered a serious complication that made
it impracticable to tackle larger applications. The key
contribution of this paper is to link to the “time band”
framework to overcome the complication.
Earlier publications by the current authors [3, 4] argued
that:
• for an ES, it is normally easier to establish the
requirements of the overall system (than to specify the
control system in isolation) by relating the specification
to the physical phenomena;
• in general, it is impractical to model the physical
components of the ES completely and it is far more
realistic to record assumptions about their behaviour;
• both the overall specification and the assumptions must
be reviewed with the client;
• further, to analyse safety aspects one requires an overall
system specification;
• notation such as rely/guarantee conditions can be used
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to record both the wider system behaviour and the
assumptions about the physical sub-components of the
ES;
• it is possible to prove that, under the assumption that
the physical components behave according to their
specifications, the control software will ensure the
overall system requirements are met.
The cited publications however ran into a serious problem
which was the description of the temporal behaviour. The
timing of everything from the overall system through the
physical sub-components of the ES down to the behaviour
of the control program has to be described, and if the
description is given on a single time index (as in [3, 4])
the descriptions become opaque. Moreover, it is alarmingly
easy to make mistakes by not realising the consequences of
formulae.5
The key development in this paper is the combination of
the ideas above with the “Time Band” concept introduced
in [5] (and expanded upon in this paper). The approach here
argues that systems tend to exhibit temporal behaviour at
a number of different granularities and trying to present a
specification on a single time axis becomes unworkable.
This paper brings together a collection of ideas (intro-
duced in Section 2) to provide an overall framework for
specifying the required behaviour of the software compo-
nents of embedded systems and, more generally, cyber phys-
ical systems.
The method of presentation employed in this paper is to
develop an illustrative example (in Section 3) of one use
of the framework.6 This illustrates that the complications
in the earlier papers [3, 4] –that resulted from expressing
assumptions and commitments on a single time axis– can be
neatly resolved by using time bands [5]. The central role of
this paper is to show that this unique combination of research
ideas offers a realistic way of deriving the specification of a
control system from the overall requirements of a CPS.
Section 4 examines fault tolerance; related work is
covered in Section 5 and conclusions drawn in Section 6.
The notation used in the current paper is intended to be
illustrative: it is not all formally defined nor is it claimed
that it would cover all examples. This paper aims to set
out the general approach — later work will formalise one
or more sets of detailed notation and proof obligations.
Our experience with working on industrial applications
(e.g. [6, 7]) indicates that it is necessary to fit in with specific
notations used.
2. CONCEPTS UNDERLYING THE FRAMEWORK
This section briefly introduces the theories and modelling
techniques that are integrated into our proposed framework.
5A specific instance of this in drafts of [4] was that a version of a
temporal formula combined the ratio of time that the gate should be open
with details about the time to activate the gate mechanism. On close
inspection, it was realised that the single formula incorrectly forced copying
of the pattern in the first hour to all subsequent periods. Using time bands,
the ratio of open:close times is expressed separately from details of gate
traversal timing and each band has a separate precision.
6Some other examples are mentioned in Section 6.
Citations are provided to detailed descriptions; illustrations
of their use are given in the case study. Our focus in this
paper is concepts rather than formal description which will
be provided in later publications.
2.1. Rely/Guarantee conditions
The idea of specifying discrete, isolated, components
with pre conditions (predicates of a single state) and
post conditions (relations between initial and final states)
is familiar from program development methods such as
VDM [8], Z [9], B [10] and Event-B [11]. Rely and
guarantee conditions were put forward in [12, 13, 14]
as a way of specifying and developing shared-variable
concurrent programs.7
The basic Rely/Guarantee idea is simple: just as post
conditions abstract from any algorithm to achieve the
transition from initial to final state, guarantee conditions
record a relation –in advance of designing the algorithm–
that defines the maximum interference that the eventual
code can inflict on its environment. The analogue of a
pre condition (which records assumptions that the developer
can make about the states in which the component will
be initiated), is a rely condition that records a relation
that expresses the interference that the eventual code must
tolerate. It is important to bear in mind that pre and
rely conditions are assumptions that a developer is invited
to make; in contrast, guarantee and post conditions are
obligations on the code to be created.
Although the rely/guarantee idea originated in the context
of the design of concurrent programs, it became clear that
the environment of a component could include physical
components. Some history of this evolution is mentioned
in [3, 4]. Developing hybrid applications such as braking
systems for cars brings in the need to use rely conditions
on continuously varying values. Assumptions about, for
example, the maximum rate of change of speed provide a
basis for deciding sampling rates on sensors. As well as
capturing assumptions about the physical world in which
the CPS will operate, rely conditions can also be used to
document assumptions about the physical sub-components
of a CPS.
Figure 1 illustrates, for a CPS that is constructed from
software (control) and the physical hardware, the top-level
use of rely (R) and guarantee conditions (G). Behaviourally,
the requirement is that the guarantee condition needs
to be satisfied (only) as long as the rely condition is
respected. Stating this negatively, if the environment makes
a transition that is not in accord with the rely condition, the
developed code is free from further obligations (just as an
implementation is unconstrained if invoked in a starting state
that does not satisfy its pre condition).
Unsurprisingly, the proof obligations concerning the
development of concurrent components (that are specified
with rely/guarantee conditions) are more complicated than
7A significant reworking [15, 16, 17] of the rely/guarantee approach
provides a more algebraic view of the various assumptions and constraints
by recasting them in the refinement calculus style [18, 19].
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FIGURE 1. Top-Level Description of CPS
those for sequential programs using Hoare-triples [20]. The
proof obligations for concurrency include the matching of
rely and guarantee conditions mentioned above as well as
laws for the distribution of such conditions over sequential
and concurrent program compositions. The key point is that
discharging the proof obligations establishes that a design
that uses a particular programming construct will, if all
of the sub-components satisfy their specifications, satisfy
the overall specification. This gives rise to the crucial
property that development is compositional in the sense
that the specification of a component determines everything
that governs its functional acceptance; when developing a
component from its specification, neither the specification
of the larger system, nor those of sibling components need
to be taken into consideration.
A single R/G specification can have internal structure so
that in the event of some aspects of the rely condition not
being true, other aspects that are still satisfied will ensure
that some behaviours are guaranteed. Indeed resilience
can be represented by hierarchically related R/Gs – strong
rely conditions guarantee full functionality, weaker rely
conditions guarantee less (perhaps only the safety-critical
parts), even weaker rely conditions guarantee only safe fail-
stop behaviour. This is discussed further in Section 4.
2.2. HJJ and Refinement
An ES consists of a software control system and physical
system components; the connections between the former and
the latter are sensors and actuators. The overall behaviour of
the ES clearly depends on both aspects. It is argued above
that the overall system is easier to specify than the controller
itself; what is proposed here is that the specification of the
software control system can be derived from the overall
system specification. To check this formally, it must be
possible to reason about the behaviour of the physical
components but, in general, building a complete model of
such physical components is unrealistic and it is far easier to
document (reviewable) assumptions about their behaviour.
The test then is, given the specification of the control
system and the assumptions about the physical components,
can it be shown that the overall system specification follows.
The ‘and’ in the previous sentence behaves like an addition;
what is actually needed is something more like subtraction.
Given the specification of the overall system, one records
assumptions about the physical components and derives a
specification for the control system that will make the above
addition hold.
The observation that rely/guarantee thinking can be
applied to systems that interact with the physical world led
to an approach that is sometimes referred to briefly by the
initial letter of the family names of its three initiators (Hayes,
Jackson and Jones): the ‘HJJ’ approach [3, 4]:
• the phenomena of interest with CPS often vary
continuously
• it is nearly always easier to obtain agreement on the
behaviour expected of an overall system than it is to
start by specifying the control system
• this follows from the fact that assumptions have to be
made about both the behaviour of components that are
external to the system and physical components within
the system
The HJJ approach advocates that the (continuous)
behaviour of the overall system is described first in terms
of phenomena that can be observed in the physical world;
assumptions about those things outside the control system
are then recorded (these include assumptions about external
components and physical components of the CPS). The
specification of the control system is that, if all of the
assumptions are fulfilled, the behaviour of the cyber system
is such that the required overall system behaviour is
achieved. It is clearly mandatory that, as well as agreeing the
overall specification with the customer/client, the validity of
the assumptions about the physical components are agreed.
In summary, HJJ is the process of moving from
requirements that are expressed in terms of state in the
environment, to the specification of the control systemwhich
can only include input/output data (and internal variables);
in making this transition, assumptions are recorded using
rely and guarantee conditions. Refinement can then be
applied to translate the software specification into executable
code.
Experience with the approach described in [3, 4] was
positive but had a major drawback that descriptions of
various requirements on a single time axis became confusing
and unintuitive. Resolving this with the help of time bands
is precisely the contribution of the current paper.
2.3. Time Bands
The above technologies adequately address the functional
properties of the ES or CPS, but do not cater for the
important temporal aspects of these systems. The motivation
for the timebands framework comes from a number of
observation about complex CPS [5, 21, 22, 23, 24]:
• the dynamics of a system (how quickly things change)
are central to understanding its behaviour
• systems can be best understood by distinguishing
different granularities (of time), i.e. there are different
abstract views of the dynamics of the system
• it is useful to view certain actions (events) as atomic and
“instantaneous” in one time band, whilst allowing them
to have internal state and behaviour that takes time at a
more detailed level of description
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• the order (but not necessarily the time) in which events
occur is important; precedence can give rise to causality
• the durations of certain actions are important, but the
measuring of time must not be made artificially precise
and must allow for tolerance (non-determinacy) in the
temporal domain
• at each level of temporal behaviour similar phenomena
are observed (e.g. cyclic/repetitive actions, deadline-
driven actions, synchronous and asynchronous event
handling, agreement, coordination).
The central notion in the framework is that of a time band
that is defined by a granularity, G , (e.g. 1 minute) and a
precision, ρ, (e.g. 3 seconds). Granularity defines the unit of
time of the band; precision bounds the maximum duration of
an event that is deemed to be instantaneous in its band.
A system description is not limited to a single time axis
but can be given more clearly in terms of a finite set of
partially ordered bands. System activities are placed in some
band B if they engage in significant events at the time scale
represented by B, i.e. they have dynamics that give rise
to changes that are observable or meaningful in band B’s
granularity.
A complete system specification must address all dynamic
behaviours. At the lowest level, circuits (e.g. gates)
have propagation delays measured in nanoseconds or
even picoseconds, at intermediate levels tasks/threads have
rates and deadlines that are usually expresses in tens of
milliseconds, at the higher levels missions can change every
hour and maintenance may need to be undertaken every
month. Understanding the behaviour of circuits allows the
worst-case execution time of tasks to be predicted, this
allows deadlines to be checked and the schedulability of
whole missions to be verified. The need to argue about
temporal behaviours at many levels of granularity should
not by addressed by mapping all temporal properties and
constraints to the finest level; the resulting model would
be unmanageable. Rather, what the Timeband framework
provides is the ability to use the different time granularities
within the system to structure its specification into a number
of distinct bands. This results in system verification
being simplified to proof obligations within each band, and
consistency checking between bands.
The basic means of presenting a specification over a
number of bands is by relating (instantaneous) events in one
band to activities, with duration, in finer bands. We use the
convention that events are represented by lower case letters,
and activities by upper case. Events in band B may map to
activities that have duration at some lower (or finer) band
C. An illustration of a three band system with the mapping
of events to activities is shown in Figure 2, where B, C
and D are timebands, x, y1, y2 and y3 are events, and Y
and Z1 are activities. The curved diagram allows events at
coarser bands to be represented by more detailed activities
at the finer bands and thus illustrates that the finer band is
a magnification of its coarser neighbour – the notion that
there is more ‘time’ in finer bands (e.g. more milliseconds
than seconds in an hour). An activity is defined to be a
y3
D C B
Y
Time
Z1
x
y1
y2
FIGURE 2. Timebands B, C and D with event x in band B
implemented by activity Y in band C, which uses events y1, y2
and y3 in band C, where event y1 is implemented by activity Z1 in
band D
sequence of (partially-ordered) events. The start and end of
an activity A are themselves represented as events, A↑ and
A↓, respectively.
The timeband framework [5] introduces and defines a
number of notions such as simultaneous, ordered, delays,
deadlines and duration. These are introduced as required in
the case study. The functional and the temporal behaviours
of a system are related by two concepts: accuracy and
may/must.
The accuracy of a reading refers to an external
continuously changing physical entity such as temperature.8
With error-free behaviour a sensed value, S , is obtained by
a read event (in some time band with precision ρ). But the
exact time when this read occurs is not known precisely. The
reading is said to be accurate to the extent S ± a , where
a is the maximum change that can occur to the physical
phenomena in time ρ.
Within a time band all entities share the same precision
and hence imprecision. This allows events to be combined
(for example, two simultaneous events being combined into
one). There is a common shared view of the precision
of time itself within the band. Any event that is defined
to occur at a particular time will have the same bound
before it is declared to be too late (or too early). A single
notion of precision facilitates a simple rule for composition.
Different dynamic phenomena will, however, have different
assessments of their accuracy. Informally, the reading of a
slowly changing phenomena will be more accurate than the
reading of a rapidly changing phenomena.
The accuracy issue often makes it impossible to specify
a precise behaviour for a system. A specification must,
however, bound the allowable behaviours despite the
uncertainty. The may/must notion provides a convenient
way of specifying bounds. Because a program cannot
precisely determine the value and/or timing of a sampling
of a value in the physical world, a specification can allow
8The example studied in the current paper avoids most issues of
continuous behaviour by focussing on one particular subsystem. In
a thermostat application, the assumed maximum rate of variation of
temperature would be used to determine the required sampling frequency
to stay within the required room temperature. An even more interesting
example would be controlling the speed of a vehicle.
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a range of possible behaviour when sensed value changes
may be observed but oblige behaviours when sensed value
changes must be observed. One application of this idea
is given in Section 4 but the notion is general and can be
deployed in many contexts.
2.4. Integrating Timebands and HJJ
The main focus and contribution of this paper is to integrate
the modelling of real-time properties as represented by
the timeband framework with the HJJ means of deriving
a specification of the (software) control system from the
overall requirements of the ES/CPS.
Each timeband has an associated set of observable
variables, with the possibility that (adjacent) timebands can
share some variables. In our earlier timebands work [5],
the state of an observable variable associated with an event
was a set of values corresponding to the values of the
variable during the execution of its implementing activity.
A simplification (or abstraction if you prefer) in the current
paper is that an event is associated with just two states –
before and after the event – and all intermediate states are
hidden (ignored). This better represents the intent behind
timebands that events are instantaneous within their band,
and allows one to give an abstract specification of an event
e in terms of its pre and post conditions, pre-e and post-e ,
respectively.
e
A
guar -A
rely-A
I ∧ pre-A post-A ∧ I
repr repr
pre-e post-e
FIGURE 3. Combining rely-guarantee with timebands
If events in a timeband B are implemented by activities in
a timeband C , the state space of C may contain,
• state variables of B that are shared,
• state variables of B that are shared but with their type
extended to allow additional values that the variables
may take on only in intermediate states (i.e. the
additional values are not visible in timeband B ), and
• new state variables introduced in timeband C .
The initial and final states of an event in band B correspond
to the initial and final states of its implementing activity in
band C via the relation repr (see Fig. 3).
Each activity, A, also has pre and post conditions, pre-A
and post-A. All activities within the band share an invariant,
I , that is maintained by every activity. The activity refines
the event using the standard data refinement relation but
augmented with a requirement that the time taken for the
activity is bounded by the precision of band B (as measured
in terms of the granularity of band C ) – see Fig. 4.
As activities take time, they are also augmented with a
rely condition, rely-A, stating any assumptions about the
behaviour of the environment during the activity, and a
guarantee condition, guar -A, that is a commitment of the
activity over its duration. All conditions may refer to (only)
state defined in the relevant time band. During activity A, as
long as rely-A remains true, guar -A is required to be true.
Other aspects of the integration are introduced by means of
the case study.
3. THE SLUICE GATE EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the notions and methods described in
this paper, the ‘sluice gate’ case study [2] is employed. The
need to irrigate an area of land could be met by the use
of a number of sluice gates that control the flow of water
through irrigation ditches. Any specific sluice gate will need
a controller and the specification of this controller forms the
focus of the case study. However the wider picture of a CPS
that monitors rain fall, flood prediction, seasonal variation
and even climate change gives the context for the application
— this gives rise to behavioural description over a number
of time bands:
Climatic To allow long term trends to be expressed.
Seasonal To allow the controls to reflect growing seasons.
Month To allow anticipated rain-fall to be expressed.
Day To allow coordination between multiple (possible
failing) gates to be expressed.
Hour To allow the actual control algorithm to be expressed
for a single gate.
Minute To allow the gate’s main movements to be
modelled.
Seconds To allow the gate’s settling time to be modelled.
Millisecond To allow the behaviour of the sensors and
switches to be expressed.
Microsecond To allow computation properties, such as
worst-case execution time to be expressed.
It is important to note that different physical phenomena
are linked to these time bands: assumptions about rainfall
would have to be made at the month band but play no
part once concern passes to finer levels; similarly, water is
actually of no concern beyond the day band — finer bands
are only concerned with movement of the gate.
In this study we focus only on the requirements for the
controller of a single gate. The physical structure of such a
sluice gate is represented in Figure 5. This gate is controlled
by a single motor and there are sensors that indicate when
the gate is at the top and when it is at the bottom. The motor
is controlled by a direction indicator (up or down) and an
on/off ‘switch’. The expected behaviour of a single gate
involves periods of time when the gate is (fully) open and
periods when it is closed (no water flows). The physical
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pre-e(s) ∧ repr(s, c) ∧ I (c) ⇒ pre-A(c) (1)
pre-e(s) ∧ repr(s, c) ∧ I (c) ∧ post-A(c, c′) ⇒ (∃s ′ · repr(s ′, c′) ∧ post-e(s, s ′)) ∧ I (c′) ∧ t ′-t ≤ ρ (2)
FIGURE 4. Data refinement between timebands: s represents the initial state of the coarser (more abstract) band and c the state of
the finer band, and s ′ and c′ the respective final states.
? ?
Top &
Bottom
Sensors
Motor
Gate
Mechanism Water
FIGURE 5. A single sluice gate
components of the ES are referred to as the MGS (motor,
gate and sensors) – see top level illustrative diagram in
Figure 1.
The design decision to use a motor with top and bottom
sensors and relevant actuators to interface to the gate is
most clearly described over three time bands:9 Each band
is defined by its granularity (G) and precision (ρ), and
into each band will be placed relevant State, Events and
Activities.
Hour Gh = 1 hour, ρh = 3 minutes.
Minute Gm = 1 minute, ρm = 3 seconds.
Seconds Gs = 1 second, ρs = 10 milliseconds.
These are the three main time bands used to organise the
description of the case study. The granularity of a band does
not have to correspond to a unit of measurement of time but
using standard units of time allows for an easier presentation
of the example.
3.1. Hour Band
The coarsest band for the single gate problem is:
Hour Gh = 1 hour, ρh = 3 minutes.
Remember that the gate position is a physical world
phenomenon: the first step of our process is to ground the
system description in terms of physical world phenomena at
a level of time discourse appropriate to the customer. The
client could express his/her requirement in terms of water
flow (per minute, per hour or per day), but having chosen a
9To capture details at the electronic level would require much finer
bands and to specify seasonal behaviour a coarser band would be required.
However, for a demonstration of the framework, we concentrate on just
three adjacent bands.
means of controlling the flow (i.e. a sluice gate) it is more
natural for the requirement to be expressed in terms of the
gate alternating between being open and closed for given
time periods.
Once placed in the Hour band this requirement becomes
unambiguous. By placing the requirement in this band it
implies that issues within the precision of the band (i.e. 3
minutes in any one hour) are immaterial to the client. Note
that this important and reasonable notion of approximation
comes for free from the time band view; it is not necessary
to write a specification in terms of minutes (or seconds!) to
specify the agreed flexibility.
To give a top-level description of the control program (in
the Hour band) requires one state variable and two events.
These are declared together with their necessary pre and post
conditions (expressed using the state variable):
SluiceGateh : (gate : {OPEN,CLOSED})
The state of the sluice gate in the hour band, SluiceGateh ,
has a single local component gate , which can be either open
or closed.10 In the pre/post conditions below gate refers to
the initial value of this component and gate ′ to its final value.
event open-gate
var out gate
pre gate = CLOSED
post gate ′ = OPEN
event close-gate
var out gate
pre gate = OPEN
post gate ′ = CLOSED
Both open-gate and close-gate are events of the CPS.
They are viewed, within the context of the hour band,
as occurring instantaneously. Their behaviour is specified
in terms of the desired behaviour of the physical gate,
even though the yet-to-be-designed control software cannot
directly move the gate (it must communicate with the
physical components using the sensors and actuators that
are introduced at a finer time band). Note that as
both events have write access to gate they cannot occur
simultaneously (i.e. their defining activities cannot overlap).
The assumption is made that in the absence of events that
explicitly change state then the state does indeed not change.
So between open-gate and closed -gate the state of the gate
is constant.
From the definition of these events and the system state,
the required schedule for the control program/activity can
be derived. The schedule activity is parameterised with the
number of hours the gate should be open, OG , alternating
with the number of hours it should be closed, CG . The
10If more than one sluice were required, the structure containing the
component gate would need to be promoted to a type.
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values of these parameters are assumed to be determined
by a yet coarser timeband; a typical activation might be
Schedule(2hr , 10hr).
activity Schedule1(OG ,CG : hour)
var out gate
pre gate = CLOSED
rely true
guar (open-gateto nextclose-gate) ⇒ dur = OG
(close-gate to nextopen-gate) ⇒ dur = CG
post gate ′ = CLOSED
In this, and following activities, there is an implied ‘and’
between the lines of the guarantee (and rely) conditions.
Line breaks are, however, deemed to effect the priority of
logical operators in the sense that each line is assumed to be
in parentheses. Relies and guarantees are required to hold for
all subintervals of the time interval over which the activity
Schedule1 operates. The interval predicate (e1 to next e2)
succeeds for an interval I , if I starts with event e1 and
ends in event e2 and there are no intervening occurrences
of e2. The interval expression dur gives the length of the
interval. The precondition refers to system start up, when
Schedule begins. The post condition requires a Schedule
activity terminate only if the gate is closed; this is consistent
with completing some number of complete cycles of the
behaviour.
There is no informative rely condition in this time band;
but the guarantee condition gives the appropriate level of
separation between the opening and closing events. This
specification can be refined to the following (where we
only give the modified behaviour – the rely and guarantee
conditions etc. are unchanged):
activity Schedule2(OG ,CG : hour)
var out gate
do (open-gate;wait(OG); close-gate;wait(CG))∗
Here, the behaviour of the control activity is specified
after the keyword do. The ∗ indicates that the behaviour
allows any number of complete cycles. The wait primitive
delays the behaviour of schedule for the designated number
of hours (plus or minus 3 minutes).
The realisation of these two events by activities of a finer
time band requires details of the behaviour of the hardware
implementing the sluice gate mechanism: motor, gate and
sensors (MGS ); these are more sensibly described at a finer
time band.
Before moving to a finer band, a simple extension
demonstrates why it is necessary to express behaviours
over a range of time granularities. It is reasonable to
assume that the irrigation policy represented by the above
schedule would not remain constant all year; rather it
is likely to be seasonal; for example, in the growing
season (summer), the gate may need to be open for longer
periods of time, e.g. Schedule(3hr , 9hr); in winter, there
might be a minimum movement of the gate (to keep it
operational); so, Schedule(1hr , 23hr). Switching between
the schedules would be defined in the Seasonal band with a
simple precondition used to determine the appropriate active
schedule.
By including bands that are more associated with human
activities than computational ones it is possible to represent
important aspects of the complete control program. For
example, in the Seasonal band it will be necessary to
determine the current season, but should this be defined
by the Meteorological Office or by the consensus view of
the users of the irrigation system? These control-related
decisions will need to be expressed in the Seasonal band,
along with any necessary assumptions (rely conditions).
3.2. Minute Band
It is typical that attention moves to a finer time band (than
that of the mechanical phenomena) when the control process
is to be addressed.
Minute Gm = 1 minute, ρm = 3 seconds.
The objective in the finer Minute band is to map (implement)
the open-gate and close-gate events to activities. In order to
do that, the necessary physical components (the sensors and
the motor that drives the gate) are considered. The properties
of these components are stated in terms of the guarantees
they provide and the rely conditions they can assume (see
MGSm in Figure 6). The open and close gate activities are
then implemented assuming the physical components will
adhere to their guarantees, provided the activities do not
contravene the rely conditions of the physical components.11
In this timeband, as well as being open or closed, the
position of the gate can also be in the state BETWEEN; this
acknowledges the fact that, in this band, the amount of time
to move the gate between its extreme positions is significant.
The variable gate is inherited from the coarser band but
its type is extended with the additional value BETWEEN.
Furthermore, the state in this band contains components
representing Boolean sensors (top and bottom) and an
actuator (direction). At this level motor is introduced to
represent the state of the entity within the MGS that causes
the gate to move. The control over the motor (via power
being either on or off) is necessarily introduced at the next
finer time band.
SluiceGatem : gate : {OPEN,CLOSED,BETWEEN}
top : Boolean
bottom : Boolean
direction : {UP,DOWN}
motor : {RUNNING, STOPPED}
As expected, if SluiceGatem .gate is BETWEEN the
open/closed state in the hour band, SluiceGateh .gate , is
not defined. The new events of the minute band are
set-direction and set-motor ; they are defined below. But
events such as set-motor cannot of themselves affect the
position of the gate , they can only write to actuators; the
control system is described in terms of the signals it sends
to the actuators and reads from sensors. To emphasise this
11The topic of fault tolerance is addressed in Section 4.
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physicalMGSm
var in direction,motor
out gate, top, bottom
pre motor = STOPPED ∧ gate = CLOSED
rely direction = UP ∧motor = RUNNING ∧ gate = OPEN ;0 motor = STOPPED
direction = DOWN ∧motor = RUNNING ∧ gate = CLOSED ;0 motor = STOPPED
⊡(motor = RUNNING) ⇒ (direction ′ = direction)
guar direction = UP ∧motor = RUNNING ;1 gate = OPEN
direction = DOWN ∧motor = RUNNING ;1 gate = CLOSED
⊡(motor = STOPPED) ⇒ gate ′ = gate
⊡(top ⇔ gate = OPEN)
⊡(bottom ⇔ gate = CLOSED)
FIGURE 6. Specification of behaviour of physical components in the Minutes timeband
point, notice that the control system would behave equally
well if it were connected to a software simulator rather than
to a physical gate.
To justify that the combined control and MGS compo-
nents satisfy the overall specification, rely conditions are re-
quired about the correspondence between the sensors and the
position of the physical gate.
Before tackling the implementation of the open and close
gate activities, one needs to understand the properties of
the given hardware components. These are represented by
the behaviour of the MGS and are recorded as the relies
and guarantees of the MGSm system (see Figure 6). These
reflect properties of the hardware over any time interval (at
the minute band) in which they are operating correctly and
hence each rely and guarantee condition is interpreted as
holding over any time interval. The precondition refers to
system start up, beforeMGS is engaged.
The notation p ;n q means that, if p holds continuously
then, within n time units (of the band) q will hold and then
q continues to hold as long as p does, and p ;0 q means
“immediate” (i.e. within the precision of the band).
The first two guarantees record that the gate will open
(close) within 1 minute (a minute being the granularity
of the band) if the motor is running with direction up
(down). The first two relies record the assumption that,
if the motor is moving up (down) and the gate reaches
the open (closed) position, then the motor will be stopped
immediately (i.e. within the precision of this band).
The notation ⊡ p is a predicate that holds for a time
interval if, for all times in the interval, p holds for the
state at that time. So the third rely condition requires
that the direction of travel of the gate is never changed
while the motor is running (direction is the value at the
start of the interval and direction ′ is the value at the end).
The third guarantee clause in the definition means that,
in any interval in which motor continuously has the value
STOPPED, the value of the gate does not change. The final
two guarantee conditions state that the top (bottom) sensor
being on corresponds to the gate being at the open (closed)
position.
Note the particular physical component identified in this
specification relies on three necessary properties of the
controlling software. The first two ensure that motor is
stopped immediately the gate reaches the top (or bottom).
By placing this rely condition in the minute band this need
for ‘immediate’ action can be implemented by an activity
(in a finer band) that has a duration of no more than ρm
(i.e. 3 seconds). The final requirement is that the controlling
software never changes the direction of travel of the gate
while the motor is engaged (because that may damage the
gate mechanism).
In terms of the performance of the MGS , it guarantees
to lift the gate within 1 minute. This easily satisfies the
implied requirement, from the hour band, to open the gate
within ρh (i.e. 3 minutes). Obviously the decision to
deploy this control system must include a check that the
physical MGS component is in conformance with the rely
conditions. DifferentMGS may have different requirements
and capabilities.
As noted earlier, the new events introduced within the
minute band are set-direction and set-motor .
event set-direction(d : {UP,DOWN})
var out direction
in motor
pre motor = STOPPED
post direction ′ = d
event set-motor(v : {RUNNING, STOPPED})
var out motor
post motor ′ = v
Note that as one of these events has write access tomotor
and the other read access they are prevented from occurring
simultaneously (and their associated activities hence cannot
overlap).
The code for the activity Open-Gate1 in Fig. 7 in
the minute band corresponding to the open-gate event is
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activity Open-Gate1
var in gate, top
out direction,motor
pre true
invariant motor = STOPPED
rely direction = UP ∧motor = RUNNING ;2 gate = OPEN
⊡(motor = STOPPED) ⇒ gate ′ = gate
⊡(top ⇔ gate = OPEN)
guar direction = UP ∧motor = RUNNING ∧ gate = OPEN ;0 motor = STOPPED
direction = DOWN ∧motor = RUNNING ∧ gate = CLOSED ;0 motor = STOPPED
⊡(motor = RUNNING) ⇒ direction ′ = direction
post gate ′ = OPEN
FIGURE 7. Activity Open-Gate1
obtained by the application of a number of HJJ/refinement
steps. An overview of the relationships is outlined in
Fig. 3. First the event itself is refined into an activity that
can take advantage of the conditions that are guaranteed
by MGSm . The relationship between the states at the
two levels, repr , in this case is just that the values of
gate correspond. Refinement allows weakening of the
precondition – see (1) in Fig. 4 – from (gate = CLOSED)
to true, (i.e. it can be omitted). The postcondition may also
be strengthened (2), although it remains unchanged in this
case. It has additional variables defined in the minute band
state. Both the precondition and postcondition are implicitly
strengthened with the invariant (motor = STOPPED). Note
the invariant is assumed to hold initially via the precondition
ofMGSm (Fig. 6).
The physical componentMGSm operates in parallel with
the activity and henceOpen-Gate1 can rely on the guarantee
of MGSm ; in this case two conditions in the guarantee are
not needed and are omitted from the rely of Open-Gate1
(although they are needed for Close-Gate1 which is not
detailed here). Symmetrically, the activity must guarantee
the rely of MGSm . Together these refinements result in the
first definition of the activity Open-Gate1 in Figure 7. The
definition of Close-Gate is similar.
Subsequent steps are within the minute band and are used
to remove direct access to state components that cannot
be accessed by the code. This is the process loosely
described above as subtracting (from the requirements in the
physical world) information about mechanical components
in order to derive a specification of the control system. For
example, in Open-Gate2, gate is no longer referenced but
the sensor variable top is. The rely condition below is
implied by the rely ofOpen-Gate1, and the guarantee below
implies the guarantee of Open-Gate1, assuming the rely of
Open-Gate1 holds.
activity Open-Gate2
var in top
out direction,motor
pre true
invariant motor = STOPPED
rely direction = UP ∧motor = RUNNING ;2 top
⊡(motor = STOPPED) ⇒ top′ = top
guar ⊡(motor = RUNNING ⇒ direction = UP)
motor = RUNNING∧top ;0 motor = STOPPED
post top′
The guarantees can now be used to define the required
behaviour of the activity. Note that motor is still referenced
at this level (via the set-motor event); in the Seconds band
this is replaced by use of an I/O routine that turns power on
and off to the motor.
We are now able to implement the activity at the
Minute band in terms of events in this band. The event
set-direction(UP) does not break the rely condition of
MGSm , not to switch the direction while the motor is
running, because the motor is assumed to be stopped
initially.
activity Open-Gate3
var in top
out direction,motor
do set-direction(UP)
→
# set-motor(RUNNING);
await(top)
→
# set-motor(STOPPED)
For events e and f , e
→
# f requires that the behaviour
described by “e; f ” happens within the precision of the
band; e
→
# f can be thought of as a single event with a
behaviour equivalent to the sequential composition of e
and f . In the second use of the simultaneous operator
above the first operand is the activity await(top); the
simultaneity requirement is then on the end event of the
await, await(top)↓, and the event set-motor(STOPPED).
As the Open-Gate activity is mapped from an event in
the hour band there is an implicit requirement that the entire
behaviour will take no more than ρh , i.e. 3 minutes.
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physicalMGSs
var in power , direction
out motor
pre motor = STOPPED ∧ power = OFF
rely ⊡(motor 6= STOPPED) ⇒ (direction ′ = direction)
guar power = ON ;1 motor = RUNNING
power = OFF ;1 motor = STOPPED
⊡(power = OFF) ∧motor = STOPPED ⇒ motor ′ = STOPPED
⊡(motor = STOPPED ⇒ power = OFF)
FIGURE 8. Specification of the physical motor, gate and sensors (MGS) in the Seconds band
In this code await(top) implies an interval of time that
is terminated by the recognition, in the control program, that
top is true. If top is true for a short interval of time (less than
ρm ) then the intervalmay be terminated, but if top is true for
a duration equal or greater than ρm then it must terminate
within that interval.
The rely condition expressed within Open-Gate2
ensures that the maximum time between the events
set-direction(UP) and await(top)↓ is at most 2 minutes
(plus 2 ρm ).
3.3. Seconds Band
The overall schedule sits naturally in the hour time band;
the physical movement of the gate was most appropriately
described at the minute band; detailed interactions with the
control component are best described at a finer time band. It
is fairly typical that this will be at least as fine as seconds.
Seconds Gs = 1 second, ρs = 10 milliseconds.
This is the appropriate time band to note that for the chosen
MGS the motor does not stop rotating instantaneously (as
observed in the Minute band). Rather there is an additional
short time interval in which the direction of travel should
not be changed. The state motor has two additional
possible values, STARTING and STOPPING, representing the
additional phases of motor operation. The control software
cannot directly control the motor, rather it must manipulate
an object in the interface (a boolean variable, power ), local
to the implementation, that controls whether power has been
applied to the motor.
SluiceGates : motor : {RUNNING, STOPPED,
STARTING, STOPPING}
power : {ON,OFF}
direction : {UP,DOWN}
The additional behaviour of the equipment in the seconds
timeband is given by MGSs in Figure 8. It strengthens the
rely ofMGSm to ensure the direction is only changed while
the motor is fully stopped (not starting, stopping or running).
Power on (off) guarantees to get the motor running (stopped)
within 1 second. If the motor is initially stopped and the
power is continuously off, the motor remains stopped. For
the motor to be fully stopped the power must be off.
It is important to understand that MGSs is not a
refinement of MGSm : the defined behaviour of the MGS
satisfies bothMGSm andMGSs specifications.
The two activities can now be defined, firstly
Set-Direction:
activity Set-Direction1(d : {UP,DOWN})
var out direction
in power ,motor
pre motor = STOPPED ∧ power = OFF
rely ⊡(power = OFF) ∧motor = STOPPED ⇒
motor ′ = STOPPED
guar ⊡(motor 6= STOPPED) ⇒
(direction ′ = direction)
post direction ′ = d
The precondition is strengthened with power = OFF based
on the last guarantee of MGSs . This is satisfied by simple
code consisting of a single assignment.
activity Set-Direction2(d : {UP,DOWN})
var out direction
do direction ← d
The specification for Set-Motor is similarly derived:
activity Set-Motor1(v : {RUNNING, STOPPED})
var out power ,motor
rely power = ON ;1 motor = RUNNING
power = OFF ;1 motor = STOPPED
guar ⊡(motor 6= STOPPED) ⇒
(direction ′ = direction)
post motor ′ = v
Once more, it is easy to write code that satisfies the
specification.
activity Set-Motor2(v : {RUNNING, STOPPED})
var out power
do power ← (if v = RUNNING then ON else OFF);
wait(2)
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The wait(2) is required to ensure that when this activity
is completed the motor is RUNNING/STOPPED (not just
STARTING/STOPPING); the event set-motor has this as
a post-condition. The wait of 2 seconds is conservative
because the motor is assumed to stop in 1 second.
3.4. Summary
Although the description above has used some notation that
has not been fully formalised, all steps can be represented
as proof obligations about which one can reason. The
overall result is the following defined behaviours (and their
associated rely conditions) for the control software. Note
that the complete specification incorporates and requires all
three bands, it has not been refined down to just the Seconds
band.
In the Hour band:
activity Schedule(OG ,CG : hour)
var out gate
pre gate = CLOSED
do (open-gate;wait(OG); close-gate;wait(CG))∗
In the Minute band:
activity Open-Gate
var in top
out direction,motor , gate
invariant motor = STOPPED
rely direction = UP ∧motor = RUNNING ;2
gate = OPEN
⊡(motor = STOPPED) ⇒ gate ′ = gate
⊡(top ⇔ gate = OPEN)
do set-direction(UP)
→
# set-motor(RUNNING);
await(top)
→
# set-motor(STOPPED)
activity Close-Gate
var in bottom
out direction,motor , gate
invariant motor = STOPPED
rely direction = DOWN ∧motor = RUNNING ;2
gate = CLOSED
⊡(motor = STOPPED) ⇒ gate ′ = gate
⊡(bottom ⇔ gate = CLOSED)
do set-direction(DOWN)
→
# set-motor(RUNNING);
await(bottom)
→
# set-motor(STOPPED)
And in the Seconds Band:
activity Set-Direction(d : {UP,DOWN})
var in motor , power
out direction
pre motor = STOPPED ∧ power = OFF
rely ⊡(power = OFF) ∧motor = STOPPED
⇒ motor ′ = STOPPED
do direction ← d
activity Set-Motor(v : {RUNNING, STOPPED})
var out motor , power
rely power = ON ;1 motor = RUNNING
power = OFF ;1 motor = STOPPED
do power ← (if v = RUNNING then ON else OFF);
wait(2)
This 3-band specification has a number of implicit timing
constraints: the Open-Gate and Close-Gate activities
must always complete in 3 minutes, and the Set-Direction
and Set-Motor activities must always complete within 3
seconds. In addition, if the top (or bottom) sensor comes on
for more than the band precision of 3 seconds then it must
be recognised, and the Set-Motor activity also completed
within that 3 seconds.
To complete this specification the abstract events of
assigning values to direction and power and the internal
events of await(top) and await(bottom) would need
to be mapped to activities (code) that is represented
at a microsecond band. This would include register
manipulation and perhaps interrupt handling. However
for the purposes of this paper this partial specification is
sufficient.
The completed specification would guarantee that the
requirements of the customer, and the constraints of the
physical components of the ES/CPS are satisfied if all
the rely conditions from the environment and physical
components remain true. Resilience is, however, more than
just satisfying functional and temporal requirements. A key
aspect of resilience is fault tolerance which we address in the
following section. An important issue here is what happens
if one or more rely conditions fail.
4. FAULT TOLERANCE
Fault tolerance is a crucial aspect of any resilient ES or CPS.
Physical components are inevitably subject to failure;12 a
link to the standard defence of hardware redundancy is made
in Section 4.4. A control system cannot achieve its desired
behaviour in the presence of arbitrary failures of components
but a resilient system should not behave in a completely
uncontrolled way when (minor) failures occur.
It is important to remember that the overall specification
of a control system is the combination of all of the time
bands: time bands are not to be viewed as refinements.
Failures can however show themselves at any time band and,
in many cases, have the interesting property that a failure at
one band has to be handled as a fault at the next coarser band.
In the framework proposed in this paper, the assumptions
about the behaviour of the physical components of a
system have been recorded as rely conditions. The
approach to increased fault tolerance is to challenge each
rely condition and where appropriate (and possible) record
nested rely/guarantee conditions that –as well as specifying
ideal behaviour in the absence of component failures– also
record weaker promises when components fail to respect the
ideal rely conditions.
12The terms fault, error and failure from [25] are used here.
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The approach proposed here is to question rely conditions
systematically and see what can be achieved even if they do
not hold. Given the importance of time bands in this paper,
attention is also given to where an activity might take longer
than the precision of the band of the corresponding event.
The position taken to monitoring of rely conditions is,
however, that extra reporting of failures has to be specified.
It is, in general, not expected that a control program will
monitor for possible deviation from its rely conditions.
This situation can be compared with Michael Jackson’s
telling rejection13 of checking pre conditions: if a program
is to test its pre condition, good decomposition suggests
decomposing to a checking routine and one that executes
the main function; the latter has an identical pre condition
to that of the whole; which could result in an infinite regress.
Assumptions –be they pre or rely conditions– are invitations
to the developer to ignore certain possible situations; it is
the obligation of the deployer to ensure (i.e. prove) that the
context will meet the assumptions. Of course, there is no
objection to specifying diagnostic messages but such extra
checks must be part of the specification.
In the sub-sections below we first consider explicit rely
conditions that are part of the specification; then the implicit
temporal rely conditions that results from the use of events
in the timeband framework. We then consider the use of the
may/must notion within health monitoring code. Finally we
give a brief indication of how hardware redundancy schemes
fit into the picture.
4.1. Challenging the rely conditions
In this section we revisit the specification derived in Sect. 3
and address each rely condition in each time band. We note
that, in general, a single fault may lead to multiple broken
rely conditions and that a single broken rely condition
could have multiple possible faults that can cause it. For
a safety-critical system the necessary safety-case often
contains arguments (about the system’s integrity) based on
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and FMEA (Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis) [26]. Rely conditions provide a focus for
FMEA (and to some extent FTA) by being explicit about the
assumptions made for correct behaviour.
Section 3.4 records every rely condition. We now consider
each in turn.
In the Hour band the rely is unbreakable (being just true
it can never be false). No further action is required.
In the Minute band (and concentrating on just the
Open-Gate activity as similar augments apply to
Close-Gate) we have for rely-Open-Gate1:
direction = UP∧motor = RUNNING ;2 gate = OPEN
⊡(motor = STOPPED) ⇒ gate ′ = gate
⊡(top ⇔ gate = OPEN)
If the first condition does not hold, the motor fails to open
the gate in the time expected. This could be due to the
motor being broken, power not being supplied or the gate
being jammed. It is impossible for the control software to
13Private verbal communication.
distinguish between these causes. Although the specification
of the MGS in the Minute band guarantees to open the gate
in one minute, the rely condition for theOpen-Gate activity
allows two minutes. An even weaker rely could therefore be
defined:
direction = UP∧motor = RUNNING ;3 gate = OPEN
With this weaker rely condition there is now a two minute
gap between what the MGS guarantees and the software
requires. This could allow extra functionality to be added
to the software, for example to attempt to remove possible
jamming by moving the gate down and up again (this would
perhaps be more useful within Close-Gate where jamming
is more likely). Any extra functionality would of course
require the specification to be modified. If the specification
is not so extended then after 3 minutes (the precision of the
Hour band in which the open-gate event is defined) then
there will be an open-gate-fail event in the Hour band (see
discussion below in Section 4.2).
The second clause of rely-Open-Gate1 embodies the
assumption that only the motor can move the gate. In
particular that an open gate will not (under the force of
gravity) slowly sink to the bottom and thereby reduce
the amount of irrigation water passing the sluice gate.
A response to this potential failure could be to check
periodically (in the Seconds band) that top remains true for
the entire time that the gate is open and the motor is stopped.
Again, this requirement whose role is to add to the resilience
of the CPS necessarily leads to an extended specification.
The final clause concerns the sensor. If this is
malfunctioning (which the control software cannot know)
then the controller cannot distinguish between motor failure
and sensor failure. If it is the sensor then the gate may be
open (at the top) but the control software has not turned off
the motor. This could lead to the motor burning out. To
prevent this eventuality two strategies can be adopted. First
the reliability of the sensor can be improved — perhaps by
replication; the use of hardware redundancy and replication
is covered in Section 4.4. Assuming that voting between
sensors is handled separately, this approach has no impact
on the specification of the software (including the rely
conditions). The second strategy is to introduce nested
rely/guarantee conditions. For example, the specification of
the software (in the Minute band) could be extended to say
that the motor never runs for more than 3 minutes in any 30
minutes. We now have a weaker rely condition (true) but a
guarantee that ensures that the motor does not burn out. Of
course with the defined system that only has sensors at the
top and bottom then the actual position of the gate when the
power is cut will be unknown. This needs to be reflected
in the Hour band when the open-gate-fail event occurs (see
discussion in Sect. 4.2).
This completes consideration of the Minute band. For
the Seconds band we have the following rely conditions; in
Set-Direction:
⊡(power = OFF) ∧motor = STOPPED ⇒
motor ′ = STOPPED
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and in Set-Power :
power = ON ;1 motor = RUNNING
power = OFF ;1 motor = STOPPED
The first clause only really requires the power supply to
the motor to be appropriately wired. In the absence of
any security issues then a high level of confidence can be
assigned to this assumption. Nevertheless it is important that
the rely condition has been explicitly stated.
The second set of clauses can again suffer from complete
functional failure or timing overrun. To check that the motor
is running (without the introduction of further sensors) could
be accomplished by monitoring the arrival time at the top (or
bottom). Again however, the failure of the gate to open (or
close) could be due to a number of reasons that the control
software cannot distinguish between. The failure to stop the
motor would need to be investigated at a level below the
Seconds band where the code for power management is to
be found – but this is beyond the scope of this study.
Note the clauses in rely-MGSm and rely-MGSs play a
different role: the control system is required to make sure
that these are not violated. Thus they become part of the
guarantee conditions for the control system.
A full treatment of the likelihood of different failure
modes requires use of a stochastic model which is beyond
the aims of the current paper but adding probabilities is
compatible with our framework.
4.2. Timing failures
As noted in the above discussion it is possible for an event
to fail. In particular any event (or collection of synchronous
events) that fails to occur within the precision of the band in
which they are defined with result in a ‘fail’ event. Indeed
for any event e there is an implicit event e-fail , with the post
condition of e-fail being weakened to true. At run-time the
environment will determine if e or e-fail occur. A system
is built on the assumption that each event will terminate
without failure; only in the consideration of fault tolerance
will the possibility of e-fail be investigated.
So event open-gate in the Hour band has an associated
event open-gate-fail . This event occurs when either the
Open-Gate activity in the Minute band fails to terminate
within 3 minutes (the precision of the Hour band), or the
activity itself signals failure. The occurrence of this failure
event could be specified to be actually generated by the
software running within the minute band; it could then cause
the control schedule to be abandoned, and perhaps a warning
signal/light/horn to be activated (in the Hour band).
A further consequence of a timing failure is when a finer-
band state, that does not correspond to any coarser-band
state, is occupied for longer than the precision of the band
within which the finer state is defined. So, for example, in
the Hour band the gate is either OPEN or CLOSED; but in
the Minute band it can also be in the state BETWEEN. The
timeband model requires that the longest time this state can
be occupied is 3 minutes (the precision of the Hour band)
per hour. But a failure (e.g. motor failure) can leave the gate
in the BETWEEN state indefinitely.
To cater for this failure behaviour the type of such state
variables in the coarser band is expanded with an undefined
value, ⊥, which is used to represent that the state is
undefined – this corresponds to it being any value in the
lower band (not just BETWEEN in the open-gate example).
To give a further example from the case study: in the
Minute band there are only two possible states for the motor,
RUNNING and STOPPED, but in the finer Seconds band
the phases of STARTING and STOPPING the motor are also
visible (see Figure 9). The variable SluiceGates .motor
being either STARTING or STOPPING for longer than the
precision ρm corresponds to SluiceGatem .motor = ⊥ in
the coarser band. The weaker post condition true holds for
any value of SluiceGatem .motor , including⊥. Because the
interpretation of ⊥ is that the value is undefined, it rarely
makes sense to explicitly use ⊥ in post conditions.
4.3. Applying the may/must notion to monitoring
There are cases where indirect inferences can be used to
indicate erroneous behaviour of the physical components.
This can then be used to monitor the run-time health of the
system. One such case is used here to illustrate both an
interesting timeband example and the may/must approach
which has quite general applicability.
It is an indirect consequence of a physical world
impossibility that the top and bottom sensors should never
both be on at the same time.
top ∧ bottom ⇔ gate = OPEN ∧ gate = CLOSED
⇔ false
The notion of “the same time” is however interesting. One
point is that a control program cannot read both sensors at
exactly the same point in time and hence it is impossible to
test this assertion. However, given that the sensors should
reflect the gate position that cannot change quickly, it would
be suspicious if both sensors were on even within a relatively
short period of time. What could be happening is some
sort of sensor flicker caused by a bad connection and such
phenomena might well be discussed at the millisecond time
band.
A control program should be allowed to raise an alert if
top and bottom are sensed in a short period of time and it
ought raise an alarm if both are sensed over a long period
of time. By placing the health monitor in some band with
precision ρ, the implication is that if top and bottom are both
on in an interval of duration greater than ρ it must identify
the fault; for an interval less than ρ it may.
The approach of may/must specification is useful in many
situations where it is necessary to allow non-determinism
but also to bound the degree of flexibility. As here, it is
particularly useful with time bands.
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Second band
⊥
STOPPEDmotor = RUNNING
motor = RUNNING STOPPED
STARTING STOPPING
Minute band
FIGURE 9. Mapping states between bands and handling undefined values
4.4. Using Hardware Redundancy
This section does not aim to offer new material; rather
it relates the proposed approach to established ideas.
Improving the resilience of the system can be handled by
incorporating more reliable sensors or multiple sensors, etc.
The final rely clause of Open-Gate1 is:
⊡(top ⇔ gate = OPEN)
This records an assumption about the relationship between
real world phenomena and the state of sensors. Such
assumptions are essential in reasoning that the combined
control/MGS systems will satisfy the overall requirement
which is expressed in terms of phenomena of the physical
world: insulating the control system from the physical
assumptions is key to the “HJJ” idea. Notice that a devious
MGS system could fail to move the gate but send timely
sensor signals to the control software and the latter would
continue to operate according to its specification. Clearly, in
this case, the whole system would not meet its specification
because its relies would not be satisfied. Also, if the
meanings of direction and top/bottom were simultaneously
reversed, it would appear to operate correctly but go up
instead of down and vice versa.
Leaving aside such malicious behaviour, there are
numerous physical failures that could result in the above
rely clause not being satisfied. The most obvious one is
probably that the sensor fails. The standard way to increase
dependability in such situations is to employ redundancy:
for a safety critical system, a designer might add an extra
sensor or even triple-modular redundant sensors. Such
expense is probably not appropriate for our sluice gate.
Multiple sensors failing is less likely than the gate being
jammed leading to the system being unable to determine
whether the gate is at the top or not. Of course, two sensors
could fail together due to a common mode failure (such
as both wires being severed at the same time because they
follow a similar path).
Another safety precaution might be to introduce a heat
sensor on the motor — this option is not pursued here.
Neither is the addition of a water flowmonitor; this would be
a significant change to the specification and would introduce
further assumptions (about the reliability and fidelity of this
additional monitor).
5. RELATEDWORK
Many other researchers address issues around CPS (and
some earlier research referred to as “hybrid systems” is
relevant); a particularly useful recent reference is [1]. This
section refers only to research that is most closely related
to our approach; for a wider survey see the reports of the
EU-funded CyPhERS14 action or the CPSoS project.15
Coping with time One major distinction of our approach
from everything else mentioned in this section is our use
of time bands as a way of obviating the need to specify
all time dependent values (often continuously varying) at
a single time granularity. The only other approach that
attempts to deal with different time granularities is that of
Corsetti [27, 28] (but they ultimately map everything down
to the lowest level).
Focus Broy and Stølen [29] introduce an approach to real-
time systems based on timed traces with specifications in the
form of assumptions (relies) and guarantees similar to those
used here but they do not make use of layering based on
timebands or implementing events as activities.
Hybrid automata The main abstraction mechanism used in
hybrid automata is the functional block that corresponds to
a component with a more abstract specification that is then
implemented by a network of components [30]. While the
partitioning into components has similarities to the approach
taken here, hybrid automata do not take advantage of
partitioning the system into time bands, instead, everything
is working within the one notion of time.
Duration Calculus The Duration Calculus [31] allows
specification of behaviour over time intervals and its
notations could be used to express some of the detailed
properties given in our example. It does not directly support
14Cyber-Physical European Roadmap & Strategy — see
http://www.cyphers.eu
15http://www.cpsos.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/D2-4-State-of-the-
art-and-future-challenges-in-cyber-physical-systems-of-2.pdf
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splitting the specification over multiple time bands.
Domain engineering Dines Bjørner has championed “Do-
main Engineering” in a series of publications. This approach
(for example [32]) certainly places a laudable emphasis on
the importance of understanding the physical world with
which the computer system has to interact. It does, however,
prompt the modelling of that world where our approach tries
to minimise this by recording only the essential assumptions
about how that world behaves. To take the example of a sys-
tem for plotting possible positions over time of aircraft: we
would record rely conditions about the relationship of mes-
sages transmitted to the pilot and the expected rate of climb;
we would avoid discussing a model of the fluid dynamics
of air over wing surfaces etc. When considering the role
of human agents within a system, it becomes mandatory to
record (only) assumptions about their behaviour since mod-
elling human minds and physical capabilities is clearly un-
achievable.
Harel’s state charts David Harel’s hierarchical state charts
[33] would seem relevant. Within a state chart, a single
state can expand to include an internal state machine with
transitions between internal states. The main difference
in our approach is that, whereas Harel expands a single
state to a state machine, we refine the state transitions
to introduce more detailed behaviour to implement the
transition, including additional intermediate states. For
example, a start chart representing the sluice gate at the
hour band could be represented by two states OPEN and
CLOSED transitions between them in opposite directions
labeled with events open and closed , but while one can
decompose a state, e.g. OPEN, to give the internal behaviour
while the gate is open, there is no way to decompose the
open event into a more complex activity as we do using
the approach outlined in the paper. In summary, state charts
focus on decomposing states, while our approach focuses on
decomposing transitions.
Four variable model David Parnas and Jan Madey [34]
recognised –on the one hand– the distinction between
physical “monitored” values (m) and the “inputs” visible
via sensors (i ) and –on the other hand– “output data
items” (o) and their effect on “controlled” values (c)
in the physical world. They distinguish three relations
NAT (m, c), IN (m, i) and OUT (o, c), which correspond
to the description of the physical world and its relationship
to the inputs and outputs of the control software, whereas
we group these into a single description of the physical
component (e.g. MGS ) but explicitly distinguish between
the relies and guarantees of the physical component, and
partition the specifications into timebands to avoid the
complexity of a monolithic specification.
Event-B Jean-Raymond Abrial uses Event-B [11] by
starting off with a abstract representation and properties of
operations at that level. He then adds state and “refines”
operations to specify more of their behaviour. However, his
events are discrete and atomic and hence he cannot represent
rely and guarantee conditions on continuous variables.
Teleo-reactive programs Earlier work [35, 36, 37] ad-
dressed describing hybrid systems using Nilsson’s teleo-
reactive programming approach [38, 39]. It allowed differ-
ent components to be specified within different time bands,
which determined, for example, how the guards of a teleo-
reactive program are to be interpreted in a “sampling” logic
[40].
6. FURTHERWORK AND CONCLUSIONS
The starting point for deriving the specification of a control
system is taken to be a description of the desired behaviour
of the complete Cyber-Physical System (CPS) in its physical
environment. This paper illustrates the benefits that can be
gained by specifying behaviours at a number of different
time granularities.
The proposed approach is built upon the mapping of
events (with pre/post conditions) in one time band to
activities (with pre and post conditions plus rely and
guarantee conditions) in a time band with finer granularity.
A process based on refinement and HJJ is used to transpose
a specification that, usefully, refers to elements of the
physical world, to one that only accesses local state and
elements of the software/hardware interface. The result is
a complete specification of the required behaviour of the
software control component of the CPS.
Much of course remains to be done. In evolving
the presented material, other examples have already been
considered. Even a humble thermostat example shows both
the useful separation of the external objectives in terms of
real world phenomena from the detail of the control program
(it also illustrates the importance of recording assumptions
about the potential rate of change of external factors). More
substantial examples that have motivated our work include
the mine pump [41], vehicle cruise control (see [6, §3])
and the iFACTS air traffic system16. Rather than work on
these post facto, we would prefer to get involved with a new
application.
Related to this point, is that it is worth repeating that
the proposed combination of ideas is to be viewed as a
framework. Different industrial contexts will be committed
to using their own standard notations and it is not our
objective to offer a single notation that must be adopted to
use our framework.
This, of course, connects to the question of tool support.
There are efforts in both Queensland and Newcastle to
provide support in Isabelle for rely/guarantee reasoning [42,
43].
One of the aims of the approach is to increase the
resilience of CPS by allowing the assumptions on which
the control system is built to be challenged and, where
appropriate, weaker guarantees to be developed from weaker
assumptions (rely conditions). Future work will extend
16See https://www.bcs.org/upload/pdf/formal-methods-100113.pdf
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this aspect of the framework by formalising how a CPS
executing in a degraded mode can return to full functionality.
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